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 “Words, as is well known, are the great foes of reality.”1
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a common urge among people, lawyers and laypersons 
alike, to demand that any agreement or contract be put in writing.  
A part of that desire amongst the populace is the unfounded idea 
that oral agreements are unenforceable.2  A more significant 
aspect, however, is the desire to protect oneself from 
misrepresentations of the other party and to have the terms of the 
agreement visible and recorded for posterity.3  Written contracts 
are more desirable than oral agreements because they protect 
against mistaken parties and they make it easier for a court to 
determine the intent of the parties during a dispute.4
When interpreting a contract, the court must apply various 
accepted common law interpretation devices.
 
5  A court first looks at 
the plain meaning of the language.6  If the plain meaning of the 
terms is unambiguous, then the court holds parties to those terms 
so long as there are no absurd results.7
 
 1. JOSEPH CONRAD, UNDER WESTERN EYES 3 (Harper & Brothers Publishers 
1911) (1911), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=8P99Y2HWGK4C& 
printsec=frontcover&dq=Under+Western+Eyes#PPA3,M1. 
 2. See McArdle v. Williams, 193 Minn. 433, 438, 258 N.W. 818, 820 (1935) 
(noting that contracts are made orally and also by the conduct of the parties).  A 
contract is enforceable “whether it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3) in 
acts, or (4), partly in one of these ways and partly in others.”  Id. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1932)); cf. Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221 
Minn. 234, 238, 21 N.W.2d 528, 530 (1946) (determining that agreements without 
clear intent, such as was present in McArdle v. Williams, are enforceable only as 
judicially created quasi-contracts and are not really contracts at all). 
  If there are any 
ambiguities, then the court can either look at extrinsic evidence, 
 3. See Johnson Bldg. Co. v. River Bluff Dev. Co., 374 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985).  “We could find that reliance on an oral representation was 
unjustifiable as a matter of law only if the written contract provision explicitly 
stated a fact completely contradictory to the claimed misrepresentation.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 4. See Benson v. Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 35, 33 N.W. 38, 40 (1887) (holding 
that a court in equity will exercise its jurisdiction over a mistake of law where “only 
very clear and convincing proofs will be sufficient to overcome the presumption 
that the written instruments which parties have executed for the purpose of 
evidencing and carrying into effect their agreements are in legal effect or in terms 
contrary to their intention”). 
 5. See infra Part VI. 
 6. See infra Part VI.A. 
 7. See infra Part VI. 
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or, if none is available, resolve the ambiguity against the drafting 
party.8
Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc. is a case that revolves entirely 
around these issues of contract interpretation.
 
9  Vacation pay has 
developed in Minnesota to be purely a contractual obligation.10  
The language of the contract must be interpreted according to the 
basic precepts of contract interpretation.11  This case note will 
outline those devices of interpretation and apply them to the Lee 
case.12  In Lee, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to properly 
interpret the employment contract because of its desire to protect 
business interests.13  The supreme court could have interpreted the 
contract to find that Lee had a right to Paid Time Off (PTO), 
without creating a substantive right to vacation pay.14  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court could have used other remedies in this 
case, such as equitable estoppel and disproportionate forfeiture, to 
arrive at a different and more equitable outcome.15
This note begins with an examination of how courts in 
Minnesota have created the contractual nature of vacation pay and 
how other jurisdictions treat vacation pay contracts.
 
16  It then 
details the Lee case and outlines the majority decision.17  The 
proper common law contractual interpretation devices are then 
detailed and applied to the Lee case.18  Then, it analyzes the Lee 
majority’s failure to use basic contract interpretation methods.19  
Other possible outcomes are outlined,20 and the note concludes 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to truly uphold the 
contractual nature of vacation pay and provides a windfall for 
employers at employees’ expense.21
 
 8. See infra Part VI.B. 
 9. Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 2007). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part VI.A. 
 12. See infra Part VI. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Part VIII. 
 15. See infra Part VIII.A–B. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 18. See infra Part VI. 
 19. See infra Part VII. 
 20. See infra Part VIII. 
 21. See infra Part IX. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF WORDS TO CONTRACTS 
The relationship between words and contracts is exceptionally 
close-knit.  It is through words that one discovers the intent of a 
contract.22  When a writing is the “complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of an agreement,”23 the courts can only look 
to the words of the document to effectuate the intent and to fulfill 
the purpose of the agreement.24
The Minnesota legislature has recognized the importance of 
words to a contract.
  The words, then, are the most 
significant and important means by which a party can express its 
intent to a court and to the other party involved. 
25  The Minnesota Plain Language Contract Act 
requires that all consumer contracts “be written in a clear and 
coherent manner using words with common and everyday 
meanings.”26
 
 22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1981) (stating that a 
court must give “reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms” when 
interpreting a contract).  See also Dayton Park Props., L.L.P. v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 
370 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871 (D. Minn. 2005) (citing Knudsen v. Transp. 
Leasing/Contract, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
intent of the contract as expressed within the “four corners of the instrument” is 
controlling)). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(1) (1981).  This type of 
written contract is assumed to contain all the terms of an agreement and so the 
meaning of the words used determines the interpretation of that contract.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. a (1981). 
 24. Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Rude, 21 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1927) (stating 
that “courts of law must enforce written contracts according to the language used 
by the contracting parties” provided that the interpretation is rational and doesn’t 
defeat the purpose of the contract).  See, e.g., Metro Office Parks v. Control Data 
Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 353, 205 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1973) (holding that a party must 
provide “clear and convincing evidence that a mistake has been made” to vary the 
intent manifested in the contract); W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minn. Workers’ Comp. 
Insurers Ass’n, Inc., No. C5–98–1244, 1999 Minn. App. LEXIS 148, at *5–6 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999) (stating that the “primary purpose in construing a contract 
is to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the language they 
used in drafting the entire contract”). 
 25. See MINN. STAT. § 325G.31 (2006).  This statute was originally passed in 
1981, was effective in 1983, and has not been amended since.  See Plain Language 
Contract Act, 1981 Minn. Laws 1245–46, ch. 274 § 3 (effective July 1, 1983). 
 26. MINN. STAT. § 325G.31 (2006).  This statute does not apply in the case of 
an employment contract and is merely included to deduce the legislative ideas 
concerning the readability of contact terms. 
  Although this statute applies only to consumer 
contracts, the intent of the legislature is clear.  It intends to protect 
unwary consumers from being forced into unfortunate and possibly 
inequitable contract terms due to inherent vagueness or 
4
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unwarranted sophistication.27
Although oral contracts are generally enforceable in 
Minnesota,
 
28 a written contract is preferred because it is a formality 
that makes it clear what duties are required and what obligations 
and services must be rendered.29  Some agreements are considered 
to be too important to even be considered enforceable without a 
writing and, as such, a writing is required by statute.30  A written 
contract is considered to be the best way to guard against spurious 
claims.31  There is a great responsibility on the drafting party, if it 
desires courts to understand and abide by its intent, to use words 
that are unambiguous and have a plain and ordinary meaning.32  
Without this, courts would be blind in their contractual 
determinations.  Courts have devised various techniques aimed at 
ascertaining the intent and meaning of the contract from the words 
contained within it.33
For the vacation pay at dispute in Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, 
Inc. to be subject to contract interpretation, it must first be 
determined that vacation pay is a contractual obligation.
  This is the task of contract interpretation. 
34
 
 27. See Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc., 712 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006).  Although this case does not comment explicitly on the legislative 
intent behind Minnesota Statutes section 325G.31, it does state that ambiguous 
contract terms must be strictly construed against the benefitted party and a court 
must determine if the contract terms contravene public policy before it can 
enforce the contract.  See id.  This indicates an understanding that a party must be 
protected against language that may be difficult to comprehend because that party 
may be subject to inequitable contract terms.  See id. 
 28. Mages v. Johanns, 431 F.3d 1132, 1141 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing McArdle v. 
Williams, 193 Minn. 433, 258 N.W. 818, 820 (1935)). 
 29. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and the 
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998). 
  If 
vacation pay is a contractual option, then any terms regarding 
vacation pay must be subject to the basic common law 
 30. See Schwinn v. Griffith, 303 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Minn. 1981). See also 
Hagelin v. Wacks, 61 Minn. 214, 216, 63 N.W. 624, 625 (1895).  The current 
statute of frauds in Minnesota requires a writing for agreements that are not to be 
performed within a year, that require the payment of another’s debt, that are in 
consideration of marriage, and that require paying a debt that was discharged by 
bankruptcy.  MINN. STAT. § 513.01 (2006).  “The statute of frauds was enacted in 
the reign of Charles II, nearly 200 years since, and . . . has been adopted with a 
remarkable approach to unanimity, not only in England, but in this country.” 
Morin v. Martz, 13 Minn. 191, 192 (1868). 
 31. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 14 (5th ed. 2006). 
 32. See cases cited supra note 24. 
 33. See infra Part VI. 
 34. 741 N.W.2d 117, 127–28 (Minn. 2007). 
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interpretation devices that are used in Minnesota.35  The court 
must first determine if vacation pay is contractual or statutory, and 
then it must apply either contractual or statutory interpretation to 
the provisions in question.36
III. THE CONTRACTUAL FOUNDATION FOR VACATION PAY 
 
Minnesota courts have been grappling with the issue of 
vacation pay for many years.  An employee of the Duluth, Missabe 
and Iron Range Railway Company brought about the first 
significant case involving vacation pay because he felt he was 
wrongfully discharged under a collective bargaining agreement.37  
That agreement included a provision in which an employee was 
eligible for vacation pay after fulfilling certain requirements.38  The 
court held that, under the contract, termination from employment 
also terminated eligibility for vacation pay.39  The court used the 
contract almost exclusively to decide the eligibility for vacation pay, 
which grounded the issue firmly in the realm of contracts.40
In 1956, the court furthered the contractual nature of vacation 
pay.
 
41  In Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., there was an employment contract 
between the plaintiff and his employer that determined eligibility 
for vacation pay.42  The court debated the existence of the contract 
because of a strike and the expiration of a collective bargaining 
agreement.43  Ultimately, the court found the agreement to be a 
valid contract.44
 
 35. See infra Part VI. 
 36. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 124–29. 
 37. Edelstein v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 225 Minn. 508, 31 
N.W.2d 465 (1948). 
 38. Id. at 524, 31 N.W.2d at 474.  To be eligible for vacation pay, an employee 
was required to work for at least 160 days and still be employed at the time of the 
vacation pay request.  Id. at 516, 31 N.W.2d at 470. 
 39. Id. at 524, 31 N.W.2d at 474. 
 40. See id. at 522, 31 N.W.2d at 473. 
 41. See Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 177, 178, 77 N.W.2d 200, 206 
(1956).  The court refers to the Edelstein decision and other cases such as 
Marranzano v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950) and Dusenka v. 
Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234, 21 N.W.2d 528 (1946).  Tynan, 247 Minn. at 177–78, 77 
N.W.2d at 206. 
 42. Id. at 179, 77 N.W.2d at 207.  The contract stated that an employee was 
eligible for fourteen days of vacation after working for at least six months and 
twenty-one days of vacation after working for at least one year.  Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
  The court held that the employee earned the right 
to those vacation benefits because he fulfilled all eligibility 
6
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requirements and that right was, in legal effect, choate.45
In Brown v. Tonka, Corp., the employee contract initially 
allowed for the payment of earned but unused vacation hours so 
long as the employment was ended in specific ways.
 
46  The contract 
was later modified to restrict the eligibility for vacation pay to only 
those employees who had worked the entire year and into the next 
year.47  The court held that the employees were “terminated 
without cause” and, thus, were entitled to their pay.48  The contract 
contained an express provision that enabled terminated employees 
to receive vacation pay, and the contract modification did not 
affect this rule.49  Since vacation pay is purely contractual, the 
employers were bound by their contract.50
Minnesota is not the only state to have a continuing debate on 
vacation pay.  It is generally determined across jurisdictions that 
vacation pay is not a gratuity but is considered wages or 
compensation for performance.
 
51  The difficulty, however, arises in 
determining when an employee’s right to payment for those wages 
vests.52  Some state courts have held that conditions precedent to 
the vesting of a right to vacation pay can be expressly agreed to in 
the contract.53
 
 45. Id.  This means that the right to the vacation pay is fully effective because 
it has “ripened or become perfected.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 46. 519 N.W.2d 474, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).  The court stated that the 
termination must be of one of three types and emphasized the final condition: “1) 
resignation with notice of one week for office hourly and two weeks for salaried 
employees; 2) voluntary and medical-related separation; 3) involuntary separation 
for other than cause.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 47. Id. at 476.  The problem that arose in Brown v. Tonka, Corp. was that 
Hasbro, Inc. bought out the employer in May 1991, closed the employee’s plant, 
and terminated all employees on December 31, 1991.  Id.  The employees sought 
payment for their 1991 vacation benefits even though they were terminated before 
their work could extend into 1992.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 478. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 54.35 (4th ed. 2001). 
 52. See id.  See also Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 
2007). 
 53. See, e.g., Sweet v. Stormont Vail Reg’l Med. Ctr., 647 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Kan. 
1982) (holding that a two-week notice provision was a condition precedent to the 
vesting of a right to payment for unused vacation hours); Rowell v. Jones & Vining, 
Inc., 524 A.2d 1208, 1211 (Me. 1987) (deciding that a condition precedent on 
eligibility does not divest vacation pay because that pay was not earned until the 
condition was met). 
  Other jurisdictions lean the other way and have 
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found a more fundamental or substantive right to vacation pay.54
IV. LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC. 
  
Minnesota recently revisited the issue of vacation pay in the case of 
Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc. 
 
In December 1991, Susan Lee was hired as a dialysis patient 
care technician for Miller-Dwan Hospital in Duluth, Minnesota.55  
In September 2000, Fresenius Medical Care, Inc. (Fresenius) 
purchased the dialysis unit from Miller-Dwan.56  Upon Lee’s 
transition into the new company, she was issued a copy of the 
employee handbook, which detailed the company’s vacation time 
or paid time off (PTO) policies.57  The PTO provisions stated that 
employees “accrue PTO hours at a set rate per pay period . . . [and] 
begin to earn PTO upon hire. . . .”58  Lee signed the employee 
handbook and continued working until her termination for 
misconduct on August 13, 200259 after having allegedly accrued 
181.86 hours of PTO.60
 
 54. See, e.g., Thompson v. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 12, 844 P.2d 
1235, 1237 (Colo. App. 1992) (concluding that unless there is an unequivocal and 
unambiguous express contractual provision detailing when the right to vacation 
pay vests, the court should imply a right to compensation to avoid forfeiture).  See 
also Stall v. Prof’l Divers of New Orleans, Inc., 739 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (La. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding that vacation pay is considered wages and under a mandatory 
payment statute the employer is required to pay regardless of contractual 
conditions). 
 55. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 119. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 120.  The court also stated that the terms “vacation time” and “paid 
time off” were used interchangeably within the employee handbook and the terms 
did not need to be distinguished.  Id. at 120 n.1. 
 58. Id. at 120.  The beginning PTO rate for new employees is 7.69 hours per 
pay period, and PTO must be requested by the employee and then approved by a 
supervisor.  Id. 
 59. Id.  Lee was terminated for misconduct after six separate safety violations 
ranging from failing to cover her mouth while coughing to offering a patient a bag 
of wild mushrooms.  Id. at 120–21.  Lee stated that her termination was based 
upon her alleged union activity, but the National Labor Relations Board found no 
merit to that claim.  Id. at 121 n.2.  She also failed to make this claim in her 
original lawsuit, so the court refused to decide the issue because it could not be 
raised on appeal.  Id. at 130. 
 60. Id. at 121. 
  The employee handbook also provided for 
payment of earned but unused PTO hours upon resignation with 
proper notice, but did not allow for payment of those PTO hours 
upon resignation without proper notice or termination for 
8
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misconduct.61
After her termination, Fresenius paid Lee the hourly wages 
owed but not her unused PTO.
 
62  After approximately two years 
elapsed, Lee brought a claim in Saint Louis County Conciliation 
Court in order to recover payment for her unused PTO.63  The 
conciliation court found for Lee in the amount of $5,053.80.64  
Fresenius appealed the order and the court granted the appeal and 
removal to Saint Louis County District Court.65  Both parties filed 
motions for summary judgment with the district court.66  The court 
granted Fresenius’ motion and denied Lee’s on the grounds that 
Lee was not eligible for earned but unused vacation pay under 
Minnesota Statutes section 181.13(a).67  She did not meet the 
contractual eligibility requirement of proper notice set forth in the 
employee handbook, and Fresenius was under no obligation to pay 
her.68
Lee promptly appealed her case to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals, which reversed the district court, reasoning that PTO is 
the same as “wages” under the statute and Lee had accrued or 
earned those wages during her career.
 
69  Those wages were earned 
and unpaid upon her termination, and therefore, Fresenius was 
obligated to pay her under the statute.70  Fresenius appealed the 
decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which then reversed the 
court of appeals and reinstated the district court’s judgment.71
 
 61. Id. at 120. 
 62. Id. at 121. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  The award included the value of Lee’s PTO ($3,011.60) as well as a 
penalty for Fresenius’ failure to pay within 24 hours of Lee’s demand.  Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 122.  “When any employer employing labor within this state 
discharges an employee, the wages or commissions actually earned and unpaid at 
the time of the discharge are immediately due and payable upon demand of the 
employee.”  MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006). 
 68. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 122. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 222, 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2006), rev’d, 741 N.W.2d 117 (2007).  The court also held that even though an 
employer is only obligated to pay vacation wages under contract, any contract that 
would provide for the withholding of that pay is statutorily prohibited and thus an 
illegal contract.  See id. at 225 (quoting Winnetka Partners Ltd. P’ship v. County of 
Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Minn. 1995)). 
 71. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 130. 
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V. THE LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC. MAJORITY’S REASONING 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning revolves around a 
few central elements.  The first is that Minnesota common law 
generally holds that there is no substantive right to vacation pay, 
only a contractual right.72  The employee handbook that outlined 
the PTO benefits for Lee was a binding contract, but under the 
terms of that contract, Lee would only be entitled to those benefits 
if she resigned with proper notice.73  Since Lee was terminated for 
misconduct, she was not entitled to payment for her unused PTO.74
The court also determined that, although common law in 
general, as well as Minnesota case law, has determined vacation pay 
to be part of an employee’s wages,
 
75 vacation pay is not covered 
under the mandatory payment provisions of section 181.13(a).76  
The court held the statute is merely a timing provision determining 
when an employer must pay the employee’s earned but unpaid 
wages.77
The court extended its analysis further to an interpretation of 
the contract in the employee handbook.  It decided that, since a 
right to vacation pay is contractual, an employer can place any 
conditions upon that right that it finds necessary.
 
78  Although Lee 
earned the right to use her PTO during her career, the provision 
requiring resignation with notice was a condition precedent to the 
vesting of her right to payment of PTO as wages.79  Lee did not 
fulfill this condition and therefore had no right to the PTO 
payments.80
 
 72. Id. at 123; see Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 177, 77 N.W.2d 200, 
206 (1956); Brown v. Tonka, Corp., 519 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 73. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. 
 74. Id. at 123–24. 
 75. Id. at 124 (citing Kohout v. Shakopee Foundry Co., 281 Minn. 401, 
403–04, 162 N.W.2d 237, 238–39 (1968); 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. 
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 54.35 (4th ed. 2001)). 
 76. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125. 
 77. Id.  The court interprets the statute as a timing provision determining 
when an employer must pay the employee’s earned but unpaid wages, not what 
payment it mandates.  Id.  This interpretation is out of deference to the so-called 
legislative intent that there be no substantive right to vacation pay, and the desire 
to avoid creating a cause of action to challenge the nonpayment of wages apart 
from the criminal liability for employers under Minnesota Statutes section 181.74.  
Id. at 125–26. 
 78. Id. at 126. 
 79. Id. at 127. 
 80. Id. 
  The court’s decision allows an employment contract to 
place any conditions on earning PTO wages without violating the 
10
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payment provisions of section 181.13(a).81  It follows that any 
employment contract that places a condition on the payment, 
rather than the earning of vacation pay, would allow for a 
divestiture of earned wages and would violate the statute.82
VI. DEVICES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND THEIR 
APPLICATION TO LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC. 
 
A. Plain and Ordinary Meaning Rule 
The initial contract interpretation device is the plain and 
ordinary meaning rule.  Language within a contract must be given 
its plain and ordinary meaning.83  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
has also defined plain and ordinary meaning to be the “usual and 
accepted meaning” or the “plain, ordinary, and popular” 
meaning.84  If the “contract is unambiguous, then the language 
must be given its plain and ordinary meaning and will be enforced 
even if the results are harsh.”85  If words are clear and the meaning 
is easily discernable, then the court should end its interpretation 
because “there is no room for construction.”86
Determining the plain meaning of words is more difficult on 
 
 
 81. See id. at 128. 
 82. Id. at 134 (Page, J., dissenting).  This is pointed out by the dissent in its 
analysis that the plain meaning of the employment contract indicated that there 
were no conditions placed upon earning PTO, but that the conditions in the 
contract were placed upon the payment of PTO and thus were invalid.  Id. 
 83. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 
(Minn. 1998) (citing Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eagles Lodge, 282 Minn. 
477, 479, 165 N.W.2d 554, 556 (1969)).  “In interpreting a contract, the language 
is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”  Id.  This holds true in other 
jurisdictions as well.  See, e.g., Office of Labor Relations v. New England Health 
Care Employees Union, Dist. 1199, AFL-CIO, 951 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Conn. 2008) 
(discussing a more liberal approach allowing “[a] fair and reasonable construction 
of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, 
natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the 
subject matter of the contract”); Jacobson v. DP Partners Ltd. P’ship, 245 S.W.3d 
102, 106 (Tex. App. 2008) (discussing a stricter approach requiring that “[t]he 
parties' intent must be taken from the agreement itself and the agreement must be 
enforced as written”). 
 84. Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960); see Carlson 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Canadian Universal 
Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 1977)). 
 85. Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 
2004) (quoting Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346–47 (Minn. 
2003)). 
 86. Phil G. Ruvelson, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 235 Minn. 243, 
254, 50 N.W.2d 629, 635 (1951). 
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its face than it appears due to the very nature of words and their 
meanings.  The meaning of words can be difficult to grasp because 
“a word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed 
meaning. . . .”87  Meaning is merely the mental word that a written 
word represents.88  Courts recently, particularly regarding 
contracts, have tried to avoid any foray into the mental realm.89  
The task then becomes to determine the meaning of the language 
that a reasonable person would place on it.90  “Courts frequently 
look to dictionaries and case law when determining the ‘plain and 
ordinary’ meaning of a contract term.”91
 
 87. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Riging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 
644 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Pearson v. State Soc. Welfare Bd., 353 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 
1960)).  Chief Justice Traynor, in his decision for the California Supreme Court, 
also held that the words used in the contract are what courts must draw on to 
determine and give effect to parties’ contractual intent.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442 
P.2d at 644.  Although this case comes from California, it has been cited and used 
in Minnesota.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 371 n.2 (Minn. 
1977) (citing as an example of courts expanding the use of parol evidence in 
contract interpretation); Am. Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 
N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing the admissibility of evidence to 
prove a meaning of contract language). 
 88. Michael Devitt, Meaning and Use, 65 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH 106, 110 (2002).  The study of semantics is greatly beyond the scope of 
this case note, but the aforementioned article is an excellent resource regarding 
the analysis of various linguistic meaning concepts.  See id. 
 89. TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers L.L.C., 677 N.W.2d 94, 102 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004).  This concept is called the “objective theory of contracts,” 
which the Minnesota courts have adopted.  Speckel by Speckel v. Perkins, 364 
N.W.2d 890, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).  Under this theory, outward 
manifestations of the party determine intent and no subjective or mental intent is 
considered.  Id.  Parties express their intent through the language of the contract 
so it would be a proper extension of the objective theory to avoid considering the 
mental meaning placed on the words by the drafter and only consider the outward 
manifestation of that meaning.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 
(1981); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 4.2 (4th ed. 2001); see also Dayton Park Props., L.L.P. v. Pac. Life Ins. 
Co., 370 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871 (D. Minn. 2005); Knudsen v. Transp. 
Leasing/Contract, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 90. Lucas v. Ganley Bros., 166 Minn. 7, 11, 206 N.W. 934, 936 (1926) (citing 
Symonds v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Minn. 491, 502 (1877)). 
 91. Ravich v. Datakey, Inc., No. A05-1496, 2006 WL 923722, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 11, 2006) (citing Bank Midwest v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn. 
2004)); cf. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310–11 (Minn. 1989) 
(citing Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383 
N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986) (stating that courts should not create ambiguities 
in contracts by using language in dictionaries to overcomplicate the plain reading 
of the terms)).  A contract “must be construed as a whole, and unambiguous 
language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”  Id. 
  This is certainly the most 
reasonable manner in which to determine the plain, ordinary, and 
12
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popular meaning of the contractual language.92
The Lee case turns on the Court’s interpretation of a single 
word, “earn.”
 
93  The central questions then are what does the word 
“earn” mean and at what point is the right to payment for PTO 
hours “earned.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb “earn” as 
“[t]o acquire by labor, service, or performance” or “[t]o do 
something that entitles one to a reward or result, whether it is 
received or not.”94  This definition is particularly telling for the Lee 
case.  Lee acquired her PTO hours by her labor.95  The contract 
provided that Lee would begin to earn her PTO hours upon hire, 
and therefore she should have begun to be entitled to them upon 
hire even if she never received them during her career.96
One can also look beyond the legal realm to try to determine 
the meaning of words.  The Oxford English Dictionary is the 
standard for defining the English language.  The most pertinent 
definition for the term “earn” is “to render an equivalent in labour 
or service for (wages); hence to obtain or deserve (money, praise, 
any advantage) as the reward of labour.”
 
97  Lee rendered her 
equivalent in labor, 30 hours of work per week, and her reward was 
her wages, along with her accrual of 8.08 hours of PTO per pay 
period.98
These definitions would imply that Lee earned her PTO hours 
through her labor and thus, upon her termination, the PTO hours 
were earned but unused.  Since PTO hours are considered wages, 
and since these wages were earned but unpaid at the time of 
termination, Fresenius should be obligated to pay Lee according to 
the statutory mandate.
 
99  This is the plain meaning of the word 
“earn” that is found in the employment contract at issue, and if this 
was the only term contained within, then interpretation would end 
here because there is clearly no ambiguity.100
 
 92. See Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960). 
 93. See Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 127 (Minn. 2007). 
 94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (8th ed. 2004). 
 95. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.  “The Paid Time Off (PTO) program allows 
you [employee] to receive paid time off based on individual preferences and 
varying needs. . . . [A]ccrual depends on your length of service and number of 
hours worked. . . . [E]mployees begin to earn PTO upon hire . . . .”  Id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 25 (2d ed. 1991). 
 98. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. 
 99. See MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006); Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 132–33 (Page, J., 
dissenting). 
 
 100. See Phil G. Ruvelson, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 235 Minn. 
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Inherent within the plain and ordinary meaning rule is the 
prohibition against absurd results.101  A court, when giving meaning 
to certain terms of a contract, must protect the integrity of a 
contract by ensuring that all terms of the contract are taken in 
context.102  If the plain meaning of one condition creates an 
absurdity, then that meaning must be subjugated to other terms 
that might lead to a more reasonable result.103  The terms in the Lee 
contract that govern vacation pay provide for the unlimited accrual 
of PTO hours throughout the employment career and the right to 
use those hours at any time during employment upon request of 
the employee and upon authorization by a supervisor.104
There are additional terms, however, that state the right to use 
and receive payment for PTO ends upon termination for 
misconduct.
  This 
appears to be a near absolute right to use and receive payment for 
PTO while employed. 
105  Lee was an at-will employee who could be 
terminated at any time and was terminated after six incidents that 
occurred between June 6, 2002 and August 6, 2002.106  The 
absurdity that results from the aforementioned condition is that an 
employee can accrue an unlimited amount of PTO hours but must 
use those hours before being terminated for misconduct—which 
can occur at any time without the knowledge of the employee.  
This would either inhibit an employee from the contractually 
permitted accrual of any significant amount of PTO hours, or it 
would force the employee to use all of her PTO hours immediately 
before termination for misconduct.  Lee’s first incident of 
misconduct occurred on June 6, 2002, and she was fired barely two 
months later.107  This interpretation would require Lee to use her 
181.86 hours108
 
243, 254, 50 N.W.2d 629, 635 (1951). 
 101. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 
(Minn. 1998) (citing Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eagles Lodge, 282 Minn. 
477, 479, 165 N.W.2d 554, 556 (1969)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 2007). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 121. 
 of accrued PTO immediately after her initial 
incident of misconduct for fear that she could be fired at any 
moment, without her knowledge, resulting in those hours being 
taken away from her.  This is clearly an absurd result that must be 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/3
  
2009] LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC. 641 
prohibited under the plain meaning rule.109
B. Interpretation of Ambiguous Terms 
 
An ambiguity inherently exists in the contract, as well.  A 
contract term is ambiguous if the language is reasonably 
susceptible to more than one interpretation.110  The ambiguity in 
the Lee contract arises in the condition to eligibility for payment.111  
The condition requires proper notice to be eligible for payment of 
earned but unused PTO.112  The ambiguity that results is the 
definitive point at which the right to payment for earned but 
unused PTO wages vests with the employee.  According to the 
terms of the contract, an employee has the right to use and be paid 
for PTO while employed, and it is only at the point of termination 
of the contract that the proper notice condition comes into play.113
There are two possible outcomes of these terms.  The first is 
that the right to use and payment for PTO vests with the employee 
while employed, and then is divested from the employee upon 
termination without proper notice for failing to fulfill that 
condition.  This outcome would clearly violate the statutory 
mandate because it would enable an employer to withhold earned 
but unpaid wages.
 
114  The second possibility is that the right to 
payment never fully vests with the employee and the employer has 
discretion to allow for the use and payment of PTO during 
employment and upon termination.  This outcome would enable 
employers to withhold payment of PTO because the right to 
payment was not earned until the notice condition was met.115
How then should the court resolve this ambiguity?  The first 
task is that one can attempt to interpret ambiguous terms by using 
extrinsic evidence to “make the court aware of the ‘surrounding 
circumstances’” and to allow the court to determine the meanings 




 109. See Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 
(Minn. 1998). 
 110. ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 
1977) (citing Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 205 
N.W.2d 121 (1973)). 
 111. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006). 
 115. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 128.  This is the view taken by the majority.  Id. 
  There does not appear to 
 116. 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.7, at 31 (rev. ed. 
15
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be any such circumstances other than Lee signing the employee 
handbook upon the initiation of employment with Fresenius.117
Since an ambiguity exists within the contract and no extrinsic 
evidence explains the meaning that each party attached to the 
terms, the next step of contract interpretation would be 
interpretation contra proferentem.
 
118  This interpretation requires that 
an ambiguous term must be construed against the drafter.119  This 
doctrine holds especially true for contracts in which the drafter 
controls all the terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.120  “[W]here a contract is open to two interpretations, the one 
more favorable to the party who did not draft the instrument 
should be adopted in the absence of a clear showing that a contrary 
meaning was intended by the parties at the time of its execution.”121
 
2008) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 (Alaska 
1982)).  This would require a discussion of the parol evidence rule, which 
excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements that would vary the 
terms of a written and fully integrated contract.  See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 
914 (3d ed. 1969); Borgersen v. Cardiovascular Sys., 729 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007).  
 117. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 119–21. 
 118. KNIFFIN, supra note 116, § 24.27, at 282–83. 
 119. Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2002) (citing 
Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enters., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 
1995)); Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1979); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); see also Deutz & Crow Co., Inc. 
v. Anderson, 354 N.W.2d 482, 486–87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Grandnorthern, Inc. 
v. West Mall P’ship, 359 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  The policy keeps 
the parties on a level playing field because the drafter often has greater bargaining 
power to determine which terms are included and which are not.  The party will 
be more likely to protect its own interests at the expense of the other party.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1981). 
 120. Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 
(Minn. 1985) (citing Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970)); see also Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 
N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982).  Adhesion contracts are generally unenforceable as 
a matter of public policy because it is imposed on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis by a 
party with greater bargaining power without opportunity for negotiation for 
services that could not be obtained elsewhere.  Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc., 
712 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 
924–25).  It could be argued that Fresenius’ employee handbook in this case was 
an adhesion contract because it was imposed on Lee by a new employer that had a 
greater bargaining position, there was no opportunity for negotiation, and Lee was 
required to sign it or lose her job.  See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120; accord Schlobohm, 326 
N.W.2d at 924–25, and Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 800.  To hold this contract 
unenforceable, however, would greatly inhibit the ability of an employer to impose 
its own standards and rules on employees of a recently acquired company. 
 121. Ecolab, Inc. v. Gartland, 537 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Wick v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 447, 453, 54 N.W.2d 805, 809 (1952)). 
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Since the intention of the parties is determined by the words 
in the contract, the language set forth in the contract should be the 
determining factor in defining ambiguous terms.122  One reading 
would allow an employee to recover earned but unused wages in 
the form of vacation pay upon termination, and the other would 
allow an employer to withhold those wages pending the completion 
of various contractual provisions.123  The interpretation of 
ambiguous terms, in lieu of any extrinsic evidence to the contrary, 
must be the more favorable interpretation to the party who did not 
draft the contract.124  Under this interpretation, it would be 
necessary to find that Lee is entitled to payment for her earned but 
unused PTO and that Fresenius is required to pay pursuant to 
statutory mandate.125
C. Questions of Law and Questions of Fact 
 
An ambiguity clearly exists in the contract’s language.126  The 
plain meaning analysis of the contract terms indicates that an 
employee earns the right to use and be paid for vacation time 
during employment, but the right to payment for those earned but 
unused wages is conditioned upon resignation with notice.127  
Therefore, there is ambiguity as to exactly when during 
employment the ultimate right to payment for earned but unused 
vacation time vests.128  This ambiguity must be settled before it can 
be determined if the condition divesting an employee of earned 
but unused vacation pay violates statutory payment mandates.129





 122. See ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554 
(Minn. 1977). 
 123. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.  The condition in question specifically refers 
to PTO upon termination as “earned but unused” and it also states that, upon 
termination for misconduct, the employer can withhold earned but unused PTO 
“unless required by state law.”  Id. 
 124. See Ecolab, 571 N.W.2d at 295; see also Hilligoss, 649 N.W.2d at 148; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). 
 125. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 131 (Page, J., dissenting); accord Ecolab, 571 N.W.2d 
at 295. 
 126. See supra Part VI.B. 
 127. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 129. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125. 
 but any determination of the meaning of ambiguous 
 130. Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn. 2003) 
(citing Art Goebel, Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515 
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contract terms is a question of fact for a jury.131  A reasonable court 
could find that this contract language is ambiguous.  There have 
been no factual findings regarding the ambiguities in the contract 
because the district court dismissed Lee’s claim by granting 
Fresenius’ motion for summary judgment.132  Since there is a 
question as to ambiguity, this must be presented to the jury to 
determine the meaning of the ambiguous terms.133  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court reviewed the appeal from the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals that overturned the motion for summary judgment,134 and 
in doing so should have at least remanded the factual issue of the 
ambiguous terms to the district court for a jury determination.135
VII. THE FAILURE OF THE MAJORITY IN LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL 
CARE, INC. TO PROPERLY INTERPRET THE CONTRACT 
 
In Lee, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to interpret the 
contractual provisions regarding vacation pay within the confines 
of accepted common law contract interpretation.  Instead, the 
majority glossed over the plain meaning of the terms of the 
contract in order to fulfill its goals.  Had the court followed a plain 
meaning analysis, it would have come to a different result.  As 
stated earlier, the plain meaning of the word “earn” indicates that 
an employee’s right to whatever is being earned vests as soon as 
 
(Minn. 1997)); but see Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 
271 (Minn. 2004) (stating that contract interpretation is a question of law that 
must be reviewed de novo).  The court cites Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. A.C.C.T., 
Inc., 580 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1998) as its main support for this proposition.  
Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 271.  The actual holding in Employers seems to indicate 
that de novo review of contract interpretation can occur only when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact to consider.  See 580 N.W.2d at 493. 
 131. Denelsbeck, 666 N.W.2d at 346 (citing Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 
276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1997)).  Since the ambiguity of contract terms is a 
factual question for a jury, then a de novo review of the contract interpretation of 
the lower courts cannot occur until the fact issue is determined.  See supra note 
103. 
 132. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 121.  A motion for summary judgment is granted when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03.  On review, any evidence or 
possible factual issues must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was granted.”  George v. Evenson, 754 N.W.2d 
335, 339 (Minn. 2008) (citing State Farm Fire Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 
883 (Minn. 2006)). 
 133. See Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 
(Minn. 1998). 
 134. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 121. 
 135. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
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that employee completes the required labor.136  The majority would 
argue that this would most likely create a substantive right to 
vacation pay, which it is trying to avoid creating.137
The court did decide that earned but unpaid vacation pay is 
considered the same as earned but unpaid wages.
 
138  Therefore, it 
would hold that one could insert the word “wages” in the 
contractual provisions in place of “PTO.”  The contract condition 
in question would then read “if your employment is terminated for 
misconduct, you will not be eligible for pay in lieu of notice or 
payment of earned but unused [wages].”139  This is clearly a 
violation of the payment mandates of Minnesota Statutes section 
181.13(a) under any reading of that statute.140
The court was quite willing to avoid interpreting the contract 
through the accepted plain meaning device because it desperately 
wanted to avoid creating a substantive right to vacation pay.  This 
desire to avoid the creation of a substantive right to vacation pay 
manifests itself significantly in the court’s reading of Minnesota 
Statutes section 181.13(a).  The court decided that this statute only 
mandates “when an employer must pay a discharged employee” and 
not “what an employer must pay.”
  The plain reading 
of the contract provisions in question clearly supported Lee’s right 
to payment for her earned but unused paid time off and the 
majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court was wrong in its 
interpretation holding that it does not. 
141  The contract defined that 
Lee’s PTO hours were already earned, and the statute required that 
payment must take place within twenty-four hours of a demand.142
Instead, the majority decided it must “consider ‘the 




 136. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125–26. 
 138. Id. at 124–25.  “To the extent we have not spoken explicitly on this rule, 
we now conclude that paid time off or vacation pay constitutes wages for purposes 
of section 181.13(a).”  Id. at 124–25.  The court limited this definition of wages to 
apply only to Minnesota Statutes section 181.13(a) and not any other statute that 
involves wages.  Id. at 125 n.3. 
 139. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
 140. See MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006).  “When any employer employing 
labor within this state discharges an employee, the wages or commissions actually 
earned and unpaid at the time of the discharge are immediately due and payable 
upon demand of the employee.”  Id. 
 141. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125 (emphasis added). 
 142. MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a). 
 143. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 129 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16). 
  By trying to avoid 
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undesirable consequences, the court created its own meaning to 
the terms of the contract.144  If the court had interpreted the 
contract properly, then it should allow the contractual conditions 
to “define what has been earned.”145  At the very least, the terms of 
the contract are ambiguous enough to remand for a jury 
determination.146  The court concluded that Lee was not even 
entitled to a remand for trial.147
If the right to vacation pay is “wholly contractual,”
 
148 then a 
provision outlining a vacation pay program must be subject to basic 
contract interpretation.  The court appears to have had two 
significant goals in mind in its decision: to avoid the creation of a 
substantive right to vacation pay149 and to protect the interests of 
employers.150
Had the court engaged in this basic exercise of contract 
interpretation, it would have come to a very different conclusion.
  By interpreting the contract in order to achieve those 
goals, the majority in turn limits the contractual nature of vacation 
pay provisions. 
151  
The contract states that an employee “accrues” PTO each pay 
period and “begin[s] to earn PTO upon hire.”152  There are no 
other conditions set forth in the contract language on the earning 
of PTO.153
 
 144. See id. at 126.  The court reasons that although the contract states that an 
employee earns PTO during each pay period, this is not a right to a direct 
monetary payment and only a right to request time off.  Id.  The right to payment 
comes after termination and is subject to contractual conditions.  Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See supra Part VI.C. 
 147. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 130. 
 148. Id. at 126 (quoting Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 177, 77 N.W.2d 
200, 206 (1956)). 
 149. See id. at 126. 
 150. See id. at 129.  The court specifically discusses the potentially dangerous 
outcomes to employers such as creating uncertainty and making it more difficult 
for them to structure their own vacation packages according to their needs.  Id. at 
126. 
 151. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 133 (Page, J., dissenting).  Justice Page, in his dissent, 
interprets the contract to state that an employee earns the right to vacation pay 
throughout the career and that the notice provision is a condition subsequent to 
the earning of PTO.  Id.  This condition would allow an employer to divest earned 
wages from the employee and this would clearly be a violation of Minnesota 
Statutes section 181.13(a).  Id. at 134. 
 152. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
 153. Id.; see also id. at 133 (Page, J., dissenting) (stating that the condition is a 
condition precedent to payment). 
  The notice condition contains the specific language that 
it is a condition on who is “eligible to be paid for earned but unused 
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Paid Time Off (PTO).”154  This condition would divest an employee 
of wages that she had earned.155  It would also provide a windfall for 
the employer and a disproportionate forfeiture for the employee.  
The employer would have had to pay these wages if it had been 
requested while the employee was still employed.156
VIII. OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court clearly failed to interpret the 
contract at issue in the Lee case within the confines of accepted 
practice.157  The majority decided that it was more important to 
protect employers and ensure that there was no substantive right to 
vacation pay.158
The court could have enabled payment to Lee of her earned 
but unused vacation pay without finding a substantive right to 
vacation pay.  This contractual right does not have to be seen to be 
in direct conflict with a substantive right to vacation pay.  The 
majority could have held Fresenius to its contract and stated that 
employers are held to the words they use in their contracts in all 
circumstances. This would uphold the contractual nature of 
vacation pay without creating a substantive right to vacation pay.  If 
those words are unclear or ambiguous, then they are subject to 
contract interpretation.  If those words are plain and clear, then an 
employer can keep those employees from earning the right to earn 
vacation time. This is the most simple outcome the majority could 
have determined, due entirely to the contractual nature of vacation 
pay.  If vacation pay is purely a contractual matter, then employers 
may place any conditions on earning vacation pay.  This is clearly 
  This decision, however, left Lee without any 
compensation for the PTO hours that she had saved during her 
employment.  The court did not need to find a substantive right to 
vacation pay in order for Lee to receive her earned, but unused, 
PTO wages. 
 
 154. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
 155. See id. at 133 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 156. See id. at 135 n.1; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 
(1981) (stating that the court can excuse a condition that would result in 
disproportionate forfeiture). 
 157. See supra Part VII. 
 158. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125.  “Minnesota law does not provide for employee 
vacation time or pay as of right; rather, the law permits employers to choose 
whether to grant employees vacation benefits.  When vacation benefits are 
granted, employers have considerable discretion in choosing how and whether to 
compensate employees for vacation time.”  Id. at 126. 
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There are other remedies beyond the most basic ones that 
have already been set forth.  The majority made it clear that it 
considered the right of an employer to place favorable conditions 
on employees’ rights to payment for vacation time to be greater 
than the employees’ rights to be paid for wages that they have 
earned.160  The court, however, could have placed a greater 
emphasis on employees’ rights.  Even if the court determined that 
the plain meaning of the contract allowed the conditions to keep 
Lee from earning a right to her vacation pay, the court could have 
put aside that condition to emphasize its protection of employees 
from burdensome and unfair employment contract provisions.  
Equitable estoppel allows a court to do just that.161
In order for a court to find equitable estoppel, it must find 
that even if a party has valid rights, it acted “in such a way as to 
induce another party to detrimentally rely on those actions.”
 
162  In 
order for a party to take advantage of this doctrine, it must show 
that there were promises made, that the party reasonably relied on 
those promises, and that harm will occur without the action of the 
court.163
In Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc., there was an implicit 





 159. See id. at 125. 
 160. See id. at 127. 
 161. See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (3d ed. 1969) (“promissory 
estoppel”).  This is referred to as promissory estoppel, but the terms are often 
interchangeable.  See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 284–85 (1996).  Promissory estoppel usually applies to 
promises made outside of contracts and without consideration.  See Constructors 
Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 291 Minn. 113, 116–17, 190 
N.W.2d 71, 74 (1971).  Although promissory estoppel may not directly apply in the 
situation of an actual contract, courts often have great discretion in refusing to 
enforce contract terms it finds to be inequitable.  See Twin City Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Johnson, 194 Minn. 1, 7, 259 N.W. 551, 553 (1935). 
 162. Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condo. Ass’n, 698 N.W.2d 449, 454 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Drake v. Reile's Transfer & Delivery, Inc., 613 
N.W.2d 428, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 163. Id. (citing Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan Corp., 450 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 
1990)). 
 164. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. 
  By allowing Lee to accumulate those hours with 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/3
  
2009] LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC. 649 
the promise that she would be able to receive payment for them at 
any time, and knowing that she could be fired at any time for 
misconduct and thus would be ineligible for payment for those 
hours, Fresenius induced Lee to rely on that promise to her 
detriment.165  The promise of payment was implicit in the 
employment contract, and it would be reasonable for an employee 
to assume that she would not be fired from her job before she 
could cash them in.166  Without the court’s action, Lee would lose 
payment for 181.86 hours of paid time off, which would amount to 
$3,011.60.167
This course of action would require the courts to make an 
affirmative choice to place the needs of the employee over the 
desire of the employer to withhold benefits from terminated 
employees.  The majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 




B. Disproportionate Forfeiture 
  This is unfortunate, especially in economically 
difficult times, because an extra $3,011.60 would be a great help to 
anyone. 
Beyond the nature of contracts allowing Lee to retain her PTO 
hours without creating a substantive right to vacation pay and 
equitable estoppel, there is another doctrine that would allow Lee 
to be paid.  If the court continued to hold that the notice provision 
was a condition precedent to earning PTO and not a condition 
precedent for payment of earned but unused wages, then the court 
could still enable Lee to be paid.  The court could use the 
disproportionate forfeiture doctrine.  A court could excuse a party 
from a condition if it would “cause disproportionate forfeiture” so 
long as the condition was not a “material part of the agreed 
exchange.”169
 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id.  The reasonableness of Lee relying on her continued employment 
is undermined by the fact that she had six disciplinary actions within a period of a 
few months preceding her termination.  See id. 
 167. See id. at 121. 
 168. See supra Part VII. 
  Forfeiture requires a loss of a right to an exchange 
 169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981); see also Burger King 
Corp. v. Family Dining, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d mem., 566 
F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977) (refusing to strictly enforce a contractual provision 
because it would amount to a forfeiture for one of the parties).  Although this rule 
has not been directly applied to Minnesota by Minnesota courts, it has been 
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on the expectation of that exchange.170  It is disproportionate if 
what is lost outweighs the risk from which the drafting party sought 
protection by the contract condition and the degree of protection 
that will be lost by excusing the condition.171
The application of this rule would be similar to that of 
equitable estoppel because it could be argued that Lee reasonably 
expected to be paid for her earned but unused vacation time, she 
lost her right to that exchange by failing to resign with notice, and 
the vacation pay provision was not a material part of her 
employment with Fresenius.
 
172  The balancing test which 
determines disproportionality falls within the discretion of the 
court.173  The condition is aimed at protecting Fresenius from the 
risk of having to pay earned but unused vacation pay to employees 
that are terminated for misconduct.174  This protection would 
clearly be lost if the court decided that this condition should not be 
enforced.  Since this determination falls within the discretion of 
the court, and the majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court clearly 
holds that employer’s rights are greater than those of employees, 
this final solution would probably fail.175
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of the majority is apparent: they sought to avoid 
creating a substantive right to vacation pay while protecting 
employers’ ability to impose favorable contracts on employees.  
When the plain meaning of words impedes one’s goal, one must 
make a decision to either abide by that meaning or find some way 
around it.  In Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc., the Minnesota 
Supreme Court decided on the latter. 176
The Lee case appears on its face to be a simple discussion of 
earned but unpaid vacation hours and the mandate of Minnesota 
Statutes section 181.13(a) that employers pay unpaid wages to 
 
 
extensively discussed by federal courts relating to Minnesota cases.  See Video 
Update, Inc. v. Videoland, Inc., 182 F.3d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1999); American Ins. 
Co. v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 829 F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. b (1981). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See supra Part VIII.A. 
 173. See American Ins. Co., 829 F.2d at 705. 
 174. See Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 2007). 
 175. See supra Part VII. 
 176. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 130. 
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terminated employees.177  The discharged employee made a 
demand for payment of earned but unused vacation pay, but the 
employer refused.178  The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that 
vacation pay was to be considered the same as wages under the 
statute, but the employee was not entitled to payment.179
The court determined that the right to vacation pay under 
common law is entirely contractual and employers have the right to 
dictate any terms on which an employee earns paid time off.
 
180  The 
court, however, failed to use any tools of contract interpretation to 
determine the meaning of the words present in the contract.181  
Instead, it interpreted the contract in an effort to achieve the goals 
of avoiding the creation of a substantive right to vacation pay and 
protecting the interests of employers.182
Vacation pay in Minnesota has long been held to be a creature 
of contracts.
  If the court had upheld 
the contractual nature of vacation pay through interpretation, it 
could have avoided creating an absolute right to vacation pay while 
maintaining the intent behind section 181.13(a). 
183  The words in the contract at issue in Lee were the 
great foe of the reality sought by the majority.  These words are 
unambiguous and they should have been given their plain and 
ordinary meaning even if it led to an undesirable result.184
 
 177. MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006).  The statute requires employers to pay 
discharged employees the “earned and unpaid” wages within twenty-four hours of 
a demand.  Id. 
 178. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 121. 
 179. Id. at 130. 
 180. See id. at 126. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 129–30. 
 183. See id. at 123; Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 178, 77 N.W.2d 200, 
206 (1956); Edelstein v. Duluth, M. & I. Range Ry. Co., 225 Minn. 508, 522, 
31 N.W.2d 465, 473 (1948); Brown v. Tonka Corp., 519 N.W.2d 474, 475 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
 184. See Bank Midwest v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 2004) (quoting 
Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346-47 (Minn. 2003)). 
  The 
court could have still achieved its goals without blatantly 
disregarding common law contract interpretation.  If it held 
Fresenius accountable for the language in its own contract, then it 
would send a message to employers to be more careful in the way 
they craft their employee handbooks.  Words do not need to be the 
enemy and can be used to achieve just ends, even if that has been 
forgotten by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
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